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A B S T R A C TObjective: There is scope for better interaction between regulators,
payers/HTA agencies, and medicines developers in their common
objective of getting new medicines to patients. This paper reports on a
tripartite early scientiﬁc advice pilot conducted by a pharmaceutical
company (developer), the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA:
regulator) and the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁt Advisory Committee (PBAC)
Secretariat (HTA agency) in Australia. The objective was to explore the
practicality, feasibility, and sustainability of means of obtaining
simultaneous scientiﬁc advice from both a regulatory and reimburse-
ment perspective. Methods: Advice was sought for two development
compounds in different disease areas. The focus was on matters of
common interest to the TGA and the PBAC (i.e. the clinical evidence).
Brieﬁng books were prepared by the developer and supplied eight
weeks prior to the meeting and only verbal advice was provided.
Results: The pilot meeting took place in 2009. Each session lasted for
approximately two hours and was structured around the questions insee front matter Copyright & 2013, International S
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ondence to: Michael Wonder, PO Box 470, Cronullathe brieﬁng books. The representatives from the TGA and PBAC
Secretariat provided well-informed, considered and careful advice
for both compounds, which was predominantly actionable and
practical. Discussion: The sessions proved highly informative and
permitted better alignment of the possible positioning of new med-
icines with the clinical evidence that regulators and HTA agencies
might subsequently require for favorable assessment. The process
provided early and clear signals to inform major development invest-
ments and the probability of successful market access. A number of
challenges need to be addressed before tripartite scientiﬁc advice can
be provided on continual basis.
Keywords: Australia, health technology assessment, payer, regulatory,
scientiﬁc advice.
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It is increasingly being recognized that there is considerable scope
for better, coordinated, and early interactions between those who
make decisions on the marketing authorization of new medicines
(regulators), those who make recommendations/decisions on their
pricing and reimbursement coverage (payers/health technology
assessment [HTA] agencies), and those who develop medicines
(developers). For many years, developers of new medicines have
used the procedures offered by regulators to obtain early scientiﬁc
advice about the clinical evidence plans necessary to support the
marketing authorization of new medicines.
Despite the fact that payers/HTA agencies base their coverage
recommendations/decisions on criteria that include a detailed
review of the same clinical evidence package submitted to
regulators, it is only recently that developers have been able to
engage early and directly with them on evidence requirement
issues such as the design of phase 3 clinical development
programs. For example, Backhouse et al. [1] recently reported
the results of a medicine developer’s early scientiﬁc advice
engagement with payers/HTA agencies in seven countries onthe design and conduct of the clinical trial program for a new oral
treatment for patients with chronic plaque psoriasis.
A logical extension of bipartite early scientiﬁc advice engage-
ments (meetings involving only regulators and developers or only
payers and developers) is to conduct tripartite interactions involving
each of the three stakeholders. There are clear potential beneﬁts to
all parties from tripartite dialogue. For example, an early and more
comprehensive mutual understanding of the expected phase 3
evidence needs of both regulators and payers/HTA agencies might
lead to developers producing a single concise clinical evidence ﬁle
(one dossier) that simultaneously meets the needs of both decision
makers and that is sufﬁcient to ensure quicker patient access [2]. The
case for tripartite scientiﬁc meetings has taken on greater relevance
in Australia with the introduction of new parallel regulatory and
reimbursement processes in 2011 [3]. Moreover, there is an ongoing
debate in certain jurisdictions about whether regulators or payers/
HTA agencies should be responsible for making decisions on com-
parative (relative) efﬁcacy and comparative (relative) effectiveness [4].
Frønsdal et al. [5] recently reported that meetings for scientiﬁc
advice in Australia before phase 3 have to date most often been
tripartite. While they were able to state that the national regulatorociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
essarily reﬂect the views or practices of our previous and current
, NSW 2230, Australia.
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agency (Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Advisory Committee [PBAC] Sec-
retariat) have found such meetings useful in terms of enhanced
understanding and trust, they did not provide any details of any
actual meetings. This article reports on a tripartite early scientiﬁc
advice pilot project that we conducted with representatives of the
TGA and the PBAC Secretariat. The meeting was conducted on
behalf of the product development sponsor, a large multinational
pharmaceutical company. As far as we are aware, it was the ﬁrst
process pilot of this type. This article provides an important
contribution to the international discussion and debate on models
of increased engagement and co-operation between technology
developers, regulators, and payers/HTA agencies.Objectives
The primary objective of the pilot was to explore the practicality,
feasibility, and value of obtaining simultaneous scientiﬁc advice
for a development compound from both a regulatory and reim-
bursement perspective with a view to identifying issues that
might promote or impede the establishment of a sustainable
tripartite (payer, regulator, developer) scientiﬁc advice process.
Additional objectives were to obtain scientiﬁc advice, to ascertain
whether or not the perspectives of the two agencies could be
aligned with respect to evidence plans for the compound, to gain
a deeper understanding on each party’s function and objectives,
and to foster mutual respect and trust.
The remainder of the article is divided into three sections.
The Methods section focuses on a description of the engage-
ment process adopted for the pilot. This is followed by the
Results section in which key observations from the perspective
of a technology developer are presented. The general ﬁndings
and implications are addressed in the Discussion section.Methods
Selection of Country
Australia was identiﬁed as a good country in which to conduct a
pilot for a number of reasons. First, the Australian medicine
regulatory and reimbursement (Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme)
systems are well established and widely respected. Australia has
what is seen to be one of the most, if not the most, rigorous
medicine reimbursement systems, and its decisions are widely
“referenced” by other countries [6]. Second, Australia has one
national public medicine regulator (TGA) and one national public
HTA agency (PBAC). They work for the same level of government,
under the same portfolio (Minister of Health) and department
(Department of Health and Ageing) [7]. This meant that conduct-
ing the pilot was administratively straightforward. Third, there
were local political initiatives to improve collaboration between
the TGA and the PBAC (i.e., the piloting of the parallel lodgment
of registration and reimbursement dossiers) [3]. Fourth, the
Australian reimbursement system is referenced internationally
such that procedural developments in Australia are likely to have
ramiﬁcations in other countries. Finally, the PBAC Secretariat
participated in an earlier bipartite payer/HTA agency engagement
pilot project and was willing to experiment with this logical
extension [1].
Tripartite Engagement Process
The engagement process was agreed during a number of prepar-
atory meetings between the developer and representatives from
the PBAC Secretariat in Canberra beginning in 2008. The agreed
process was similar to that developed for the earlier payer/HTAagency bipartite engagement pilot involving the PBAC Secretariat
with any such advice being nonbinding on the PBAC [1]. Key
elements of the process are shown in Figure 1 and are summar-
ized brieﬂy in the following text.
The focus of the engagement was on matters of common
interest to the TGA and the PBAC (i.e., the clinical evidence).
Matters of interest to the TGA but not to the PBAC (e.g.,
pharmaceutical chemistry, animal toxicity, and manufacturing)
and those of interest to the PBAC but not to the TGA (e.g.,
economic evidence, measurement of patient utility, cost-effec-
tiveness, budget impact, risk-sharing arrangement, and quality
use of medicine) were not considered. While acceptable cost-
effectiveness is an important decision-making criterion of the
PBAC, such determinations are underpinned by the strength and
relevance of the supporting clinical evidence.
The technology developer selected two compounds for the
pilot engagement: one was a compound to treat patients with
cardiovascular disease and the other was a compound for
patients with a musculoskeletal condition. In both cases, the
proposed phase 3 clinical trials were presented for discussion
with well advanced (but not yet ﬁnalized) trial designs. In other
words, the timing was planned to allow for any changes that
might be deemed necessary following the scientiﬁc advice
received. Arrangements had been made with other agencies to
discuss the clinical development plans for these two compounds,
but the joint discussion with the TGA and the PBAC Secretariat
was one of the ﬁrst of such scientiﬁc advice meetings.
At the time the TGA did not have an established process for
giving early scientiﬁc advice unlike regulators in other countries.
While the PBAC Secretariat has a well established pre-submission
consultation process, such meetings have tended to occur close
to the lodgment of a reimbursement submission when substan-
tive phase 3 data have been realized.
Participants
Participants would include the developer’s decision makers for
the pilot compounds (i.e., key members of the compound’s global
project team— clinical, regulatory, reimbursement, and market-
ing) and expert scientiﬁc advisors from both the TGA and the
PBAC Secretariat. It was agreed that participating advisors would
be excluded from any downstream assessment of a submission
to support a request for subsidy. Legally, it was not possible for
the actual decision makers (i.e., TGA delegate and/or PBAC
members) to participate as advisors in the pilot because any
advice given might be considered as an interim decision.
Brieﬁng Documentation
It was agreed that the developer would produce a brieﬁng book
for each compound outlining a proposed clinical development
program and submit it to the agencies 8 weeks in advance of a
face-to-face meeting. In each case, the brieﬁng book focused on
proposed target patient population(s), indication(s), comparator
(s), trial outcomes, and duration of follow-up of the proposed
phase 3 clinical trials and how they had been determined. Each
brieﬁng book included questions for the agencies aimed at testing
the suitability of the proposed evidence plans for the purposes of
supporting payer as well as regulatory decisions. The questions
needed to be of an active rather than a passive nature, for
example, “Comparator X is proposed because…” rather than
“Which comparator should the developer choose?” Figure 2 out-
lines some indicative questions.
Format of Advice
The TGA and the PBAC Secretariat agreed that they would liaise
with each other before the meeting to ensure that their approach
Fig. 1 – Schematic representation of the tripartite scientiﬁc advice process.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 0 6 7 – 1 0 7 3 1069to giving advice would be coordinated. While they would discuss
each other’s response to the questions in the brieﬁng book, they
would not attempt to produce one consolidated, agreed position
because both agencies reserved the right to develop and express
their own independent views. Furthermore, the advice would be
considered binding on any party. No aspect of the advice to be
given would be considered binding on any party in keeping with
standard practice by regulators, including the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).Results
Following a brieﬁng phase, the pilot scientiﬁc advice meetings for
both compounds took place at the ofﬁces of the TGA in Canberra
in May 2009. Each scientiﬁc advice session lasted forapproximately 2 hours and was structured by way of verbal
responses from representatives from the TGA and the PBAC
Secretariat to each of the questions posed in the brieﬁng books
followed by a tripartite discussion. Key observations of partic-
ipating parties are summarized, in turn, now in relation to the
process set out in Figure 1.
Considerable effort was made to produce succinct, relevant,
and high-quality brieﬁng books. The advisors commented that
too much disease area background information was provided in
one of the brieﬁng books, which signiﬁcantly increased the
departmental ofﬁcials’ preparation time. In contrast, the other
brieﬁng book focused predominantly on proposed clinical devel-
opment proposals (i.e., the team’s understanding of current
pathways of the management of the disease, the team’s view
on the compound’s likely position within the pathway, and the
team’s draft evidence [clinical and economic] plan to support the
Fig. 2 – Example questions.
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easier to work with.
Because members of both project teams had limited knowl-
edge of the Australian health care system, they were well briefed
before the meeting by their local colleagues on operational
aspects of the Australian medicine registration and reimburse-
ment systems.
A key interest on the part of the developer was to explore the
potential for enhanced alignment between the global drug develop-
ment process and the evidence needs of regulators and payers. The
traditional paradigm of global project teams has been to focus on
evidence issues to support regulatory approval to the exclusion of
payers. Therefore, a major beneﬁt of the engagement was that key
members of global project teams, such as clinical team leaders,
were present to interact with, and hear directly from, the PBAC
Secretariat (for the ﬁrst time) as well as from the TGA about the
evidence challenges that need to be addressed during phase 3 to
support subsequent coverage decisions in an internationally inﬂu-
ential HTA-driven market rather than second-hand at an internal
company debrieﬁng meeting at another location sometime later.
The duration of the sessions was sufﬁcient to obtain clear
advice given the format and content of the brieﬁng materials.
Some areas for discussion were not relevant to one or the other
advisory group. While the TGA was interested in results from all
preregistration clinical trials and activities (i.e., phases 1, 2, and
3), the PBAC Secretariat was much more interested in phase 3
clinical trials.
Representatives from the TGA and the PBAC Secretariat
provided well-informed, considered, and careful advice for both
compounds on several aspects such as the likely local positioning
of the compound, inclusion and exclusion criteria for phase 3
clinical trials, comparator(s), and outcomes, all of which was
predominantly actionable and practical. The two project teams
adopted different strategies for the meeting; while both teams
had a view on the likely positioning and use of their respective
compounds, one took a consistent, ﬂexible position whereas theother chose to adopt a rather ﬁrm view that was different to what
was presented in the brieﬁng materials. This meant that the
advisors spent a lot of time trying to understand material and
plans being introduced for the ﬁrst time in the meeting and how
they differed from the content of brieﬁng documents that they
had spent much time reviewing.
There were no important divergences in the advice from the
TGA and the PBAC Secretariat with respect to key phase 3 clinical
trial design attributes as set out in Figure 1. The supply of
convergent advice means that a sponsor does not have to
reconcile conﬂicting advice and either compromise (i.e., design
and conduct a phase 3 clinical trial that partly satisﬁes both
parties) or design and conduct an additional clinical trial to
satisfy the needs of both parties. Equally, had it been the case
that there were divergent views, then the three parties would
either be in a position to reach agreement or to discuss how the
remaining paradoxes could be managed.
A similar ﬁnding was observed in previous bipartite early
scientiﬁc advice experiments that compared the clinical evidence
requirements of HTA agencies from countries with very different
pricing and reimbursement systems for a different compound for
different indication/patient population [1]. The high level of
consistency on the advice provided by the two agencies conﬂicts
with a view prevailing in the industry that payers’ clinical
evidence needs cannot be met in pivotal phase 3 clinical trials
because of the constraints imposed by regulators’ requirements.
At the end of the meeting, there was a discussion between all
the participants in which a frank exchange occurred on the
quality of brieﬁng materials, the engagement process, and the
conduct of the meeting.
Representatives from the TGA and the PBAC Secretariat made
the comment that while the meeting was worthwhile it was also
resource intensive and that they would face some challenges
offering joint scientiﬁc advice to technology developers as a
regular service under their current structures and budgets. New
operating models for both agencies would be required for joint
scientiﬁc advice to be offered on an on-going basis in Australia.
The feedback from the two pharmaceutical company project
teams was that they liked the meeting format and that it was
conducted in a friendly and informal manner. The advice given
was both constructive and actionable; it helped them gain a
broader understanding of the issues and to prioritize the major
ones. They found the agencies to be well prepared and aligned,
albeit that there was prior communication/discussion between
them. The timing of the meeting in relation to the compounds’
development timelines was considered to be “about right” as was
the time allocated for discussion.Discussion
Frønsdal et al. [5] have recently noted that there has been an
increasing focus on the relationship between HTA and regulatory
assessments and how regulatory, HTA, coverage bodies, and
industry might work better together to improve efﬁciency and
the alignment of processes [5].
The supply of scientiﬁc advice from a regulator and payer/
HTA agency on a parallel basis rather than on a serial basis has
even greater signiﬁcance in Australia where it is now possible to
submit a regulatory dossier to the TGA and a reimbursement
submission to the PBAC for a new medicine on the same day [8].
It is too early to determine whether the new parallel TGA and
PBAC processes will be associated with a greater demand for
early joint scientiﬁc advice.
An important measure of the success of any scientiﬁc advice
meeting is the impact of the advice on the compound’s clinical
development program and on the views and proportions of
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ment perceived in the quality and relevance of submissions they
receive over time. It is not (yet) possible to conduct such an
assessment for the two development compounds that were
discussed at the 2009 meeting. The development of the com-
pound for cardiovascular disease has since been discontinued for
reasons unrelated to the scientiﬁc advice provided by the TGA
and the PBAC Secretariat. The other compound has since under-
gone phase 3 clinical development but is yet to be registered in
Australia.
Availability of tripartite scientiﬁc advice, however, does
remove a key perverse incentive in pharmaceutical industry
research that has obstructed efﬁcient planning for clinical evi-
dence development for payers/HTA agencies. The practice of
incentivizing clinical development divisions only on the rate
and efﬁciency with which they achieve regulatory approvals is
no longer an appropriate or sufﬁcient performance metric for
assessing their contribution to product development. Initiatives
such as early scientiﬁc advice from payers/HTA agencies will
enhance and draw more attention to the development of per-
formance metrics for clinical development departments that are
related to the nature and timeliness of “reimbursable marketing
authorizations.” Failure to seek tripartite scientiﬁc advice or to
appropriately act on it will become highly visible. Similarly, HTA
agencies may appreciate better that those paradoxical evidence
needs between regulators and HTA agencies often lead to
thoughtful and balanced clinical trial design decisions that until
now may have been deemed by payers/HTA agencies to be willful
avoidance of payer-relevant evidence issues.
Notwithstanding their initial appeal, the pilot identiﬁed a
number of impediments that will need to be addressed before
tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings can be offered to technology
developers on a regular, sustainable basis. These impediments
mostly relate to the current legal and operational (i.e., human
resource) constraints of regulators and payers/HTA agencies.
Tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings will be particularly suc-
cessful if the brieﬁng books and subsequent discussions focus on
the areas of mutual interest (i.e., phase 3 clinical trials) (see
Fig. 1).
Regulators and payers might like to consider the development
of nonbinding joint written guidance on the preparation of
brieﬁng books and the framing of questions if tripartite scientiﬁc
advice meetings are to become routine practice.
A request was made for the supply of joint or separate written
advice; this is consistent with the current bipartite regulatory
model in which the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the
US FDA provide written advice to technology developers to
support their verbal advice provided at the end of phase 2/ pre–
phase 3 meetings.
Although it was understood beforehand that there would be
no written advice, written draft responses to the questions in
advance of the meeting would have been useful because this
would have enabled the meeting to focus on speciﬁc issues
requiring clariﬁcation and more targeted, in-depth discussion.
This is the practice adopted by the FDA.
The reasons why both agencies could not provide written advice
were understood and accepted. Hopefully written advice will be
provided in future pilots in Australia and elsewhere. The technology
developer was therefore left to take ample notes from the meeting.
The supply of written advice will help deliver key ﬁndings/mes-
sages to key internal development decision makers and senior
management who are not able to attend such meetings.
The TGA and the PBAC were represented by senior ofﬁcials
with considerable experience in the registration and reimburse-
ment of new medicines. They were able to draw upon their
considerable knowledge and experience to provide some very
insightful advice. Some of these people now have senior roles inother sections within the Department of Health and Ageing. They
probably would not be able to contribute to tripartite meetings on
a regular basis; their substitutes might not have as much
corporate knowledge and experience, and so the advice that they
might provide might not be as “rich.”
While we found that the TGA and the PBAC Secretariat gave
convergent scientiﬁc advice, it should be noted that this was for
just two development compounds; it remains to be seen whether
they would provide consistent advice for the development of a
given compound.
There are inherent risks associated with the seeking of early
scientiﬁc advice, one of which is that the development of given
compound might be terminated at a later date with the resultant
perception that the time and the effort provided was wasted. Our
view is that the time and the effort expended by all three parties
was not wasted; it is important for pharmaceutical companies to
be able to terminate commercially invalid developments before
major investment decisions such as the decision to proceed to
phase 3 clinical development are made. It is not a risk but a
commonsensical opportunity to take advice, which saves com-
panies time and increases the likelihood that those projects that
do survive the process may have relevance to the authorities’
objectives of improving public health. In the long run, it should
lead to more clinically relevant (valuable) and focused submis-
sions being prepared and lodged by pharmaceutical companies,
saving agency time.
A co-primary objective of the pilot was to test the process, and
Australia was an ideal pilot candidate. While Australia is not a
major market of the global pharmaceutical industry in terms of
sales, many countries and companies pay close attention to PBAC
outcomes given the committee’s long experience in the applica-
tion of HTA methods to address public health care objectives.
The cost of global project team members having to travel to
Australia to attend the tripartite scientiﬁc meeting was not trivial
but pales into insigniﬁcance when compared with the cost of
phase 3 clinical trials. There is no suggestion that tripartite
scientiﬁc advice should always be sought in Australia.
The momentum for tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings con-
tinues to build elsewhere with different operating models. We
note that tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings involving the
Medicinal Products Agency, the Dental and Pharmaceutical Ben-
eﬁts Agency, and several pharmaceutical companies occurred in
Sweden in 2010-2011 on a fee-for-service basis [9]. In the United
Kingdom, the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence
(NICE) is now offering joint scientiﬁc advice to the developers of
new medicines with the Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency as well as with the EMA again on a fee-for-
service basis [10].
At the European level, the 2012-2015 Joint Action Plan of the
European Network for Health Technology Assessment will focus
on strengthening the practical application of tools and
approaches to cross-border HTA collaboration, bringing it to a
higher level of understanding (both for the Commission and the
European Union member states) of ways to establish a sustain-
able structure for HTA work in the European Union. The 2012-
2015 Joint Action Plan includes a number of work programs that
will address methodology development and evidence generation
through the development of guidelines and pilot programs [11].
The Scientiﬁc Advice Working Party of the Committee for
Medicinal Products for Human Use of the EMA will continue to
conduct pilot tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings in 2013, but it is
unclear which HTA agencies other than NICE will be involved
[12]. The EMA and the European Network for Health Technology
Assessment have been collaborating since 2010 on how the
European Public Assessment Reports can make a better contri-
bution to the assessment of relative effectiveness by HTA
agencies in the European Union member states [13].
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for Innovation in Regulatory Science, Tapestry Networks, and the
Green Park Collaborative (GPC), respectively [14–16]. These have
been led by private organizations not directly involved in the
development, regulation, or purchasing of health care technolo-
gies with different operating models and the involvement of
multiple technology developers, clinicians, and/or patients. There
is limited information in the public domain on all these activities,
and so it is not possible to compare and contrast the different
operating models to determine which one is the most efﬁcient
and sustainable. In our view, greater progress will be made when
such activities are initiated and coordinated by the three main
stakeholders, that is, developers, regulators, and those institu-
tions who assess monetary valuations of the clinical evidence.
Furthermore, this would be enhanced by the publication of
ﬁndings of such engagement meetings.
Tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings have the potential to
change (improve) relationships and shift paradigms. Developers
will have a greater appreciation of the challenges of medicine
registration and reimbursement, and regulators and payers/HTA
agencies will have a greater appreciation of the challenges of
medicine development. If the intended users of the evidence
package are regulators and payers/HTA agencies, then it makes
sense to consult them on what evidence should be generated.
This is not to suggest that the two agencies should be merged
(i.e., there should not be a single decision maker for registration
and reimbursement). The TGA and the PBAC are governed by
different legislation and have different processes and decision-
making criteria; there is no compelling need for change here.
The direct interaction tripartite scientiﬁc advice meeting
model was seen as an attractive one because of the opportunity
to obtain advice from two important agencies at the same time.
The regulators and payers/HTA agencies may prefer other models
if faced with a large demand for advice for which they are not
resourced. A possible solution is for the respective agencies to
form alliances/networks with their respective international coun-
terparts to share the burden. On the regulatory side, we note that
the EMA and the FDA have initiated a program to provide parallel
scientiﬁc advice to technology developers and increase the level
of their interaction/collaboration [17,18].
There may be a partial alternative if the payers/HTA agencies
and regulators were able to collaborate in the joint production of
disease-speciﬁc evidence development guidance notes based on
a synopsis of the key evidence issues and recurrent weaknesses
arising from their joint assessments/appraisals. The devil of any
such guidance will surely be in the detail [19]. The purpose would
be to enhance the efﬁciency and focus of scientiﬁc advisory
meetings. Notably, some regulatory agencies currently maintain
published advice to sponsors of clinical trials. If such written
advice to sponsors could be prepared in future with the involve-
ment of payers/HTA agencies and a focus on clinical effective-
ness (beyond efﬁcacy), considerable efﬁciencies might be gained
from which all parties and patients would beneﬁt.
The GPC has begun to develop a pilot evidence guidance
document that will provide recommendations for the design of
clinical trials of new pharmacologic treatments for patients with
Alzheimer’s disease. The GPC has also begun exploratory work
and a pilot project to develop general (i.e., non–disease-speciﬁc)
methodological guidance on issues of trial design and evidence
generation [20].
It is unclear what aspects of trial design and evidence gen-
eration will be covered in the GPC pilot and what the beneﬁts will
be. The major payers/HTA agencies have well-known and estab-
lished views on trial design issues.
Another operating model is one whereby the regulators and
payers/HTA agencies apply a fee for scientiﬁc advice. We note
that the EMA already charges for providing scientiﬁc advice [21].On the payer/HTA agency side, NICE now offers bipartite and
tripartite scientiﬁc advice for a fee [10]. While this might address
their cost issues, it might not solve their competency issue. The
best model is to get those closest to the decision makers to
provide the scientiﬁc advice. Under a fee-for-service model, those
who provide advice might do this full time and thus have less
exposure to the decision makers (i.e., they do not sit in on actual
decision-making meetings/sessions).
An enhanced operating model would be one in which the
developer provides feedback to the regulator and payer/HTA
agency on whether the advice they gave had an inﬂuence on
phase 3 clinical trials and if not, why not. A developer reserves
the right to not accept such advice if the weight of advice from
other regulators and/or payers/HTA agencies suggests another
course is taken. Such trade-offs are inevitable in multinational
evidence planning. Ideally, feedback would be given face to face,
but that might not always be feasible. A more viable option is to
provide written feedback in the local registration and reimburse-
ment dossiers.
Most of the limited experience to date has been with the
developers of new pharmaceutical technologies, but there is no
reason why tripartite scientiﬁc advice meetings should not be any
less important and successful for the developers of other technol-
ogy types. One could predict that the case for scientiﬁc advice
meetings will have even greater impact for codependent technol-
ogies, especially in situations in which there are different payers/
HTA agencies for different components. We note that NICE has
recently developed new services targeted to the manufacturers of
new medical technologies (devices and diagnostics) [10]. The
developers of new health care technologies now have opportuni-
ties to obtain scientiﬁc advice from an increasing number of
agencies to the point that it is probably impractical and unneces-
sary to engage with all of them. Careful thought will be required to
determine which agencies should be approached for advice and in
what sequence such advice should be obtained.
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